Insecure work in New Zealand
By Bill Rosenberg
There is a growing concern in New Zealand and internationally about the breakdown of ‘standard’ employment relationships, usually defined as a permanent, full time employee-employer relationship. This article surveys the types of non-standard employment arrangements that are now common in New Zealand, and why these arrangements often lead to insecure and exploitative
Not all alternatives to standard employment are undesirable. For example, part time work enables parents to mix work with looking after their families. Casual or labour hire work may suit some people if they genuinely have the flexibility to choose when to accept work and are not punished for declining. Some people prefer the perceived freedom of ‘being their own boss’ through self-employment.
The problems come when these are not real choices or they are the result of employers taking advantage of their superior bargaining power. It is particularly true of situations where employees are subject to unwanted job insecurity. For example, job or task auction sites like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,1 Uber in transport, and proposals for a similar ‘app’ system for residential care work open up new areas for insecurity and exploitation. They explicitly create a ‘market’ close to the classic sense in which the labour of would-be workers is auctioned to would-be employers on an ‘as-needed’ basis from the employer’s point of view. In the case of job or task auction sites, workers may come from virtually anywhere in the world. The term ‘employer’ is used loosely here because in general the form of ‘employment’ is as a self-employed contractor with no employment rights. Unless regulated such work provides no security, no minimum wages or conditions, no opportunities for training or professional development. It is wide open to discrimination on grounds such as gender, ethnicity, politics, religion, unfair comment, or simply what a would-be worker looks like. It can undermine better quality jobs in the same industries.
The New Zealand Council of Trade Unions (CTU) explored insecurity in New Zealand in its 2013 report Under Pressure.2 This article uses material from that report and adds updated information. It also looks at the exploitation of migrant workers as a particularly vulnerable group. Under Pressure emphasised that insecurity is not simply about the availability of work. Building on the work of Deborah Tucker and Guy Standing on precarious work, it presented five main dimensions that could indicate precarity: certainty of ongoing employment (or earnings); degree of employee control (including low bargaining power and dangerous or unhealthy work); level of income; level of benefits (lack of access to standard non-wage benefits such as sick leave, or to education and training); and degree of regulatory and union protection.
Uncertainty of ongoing employment
This takes the form of high risk of job loss, a job that can be terminated with little or no prior notice by the employer, no explicit or implicit contract for ongoing employment, uncertain or irregular earnings, and no career prospects. Under Pressure estimated that in 2012 over 30 per cent of the labour force, excluding employers, were insecure because they had temporary jobs, were permanent workers expecting job loss within a year, were unemployed or were in particularly insecure self-employment.
Questions in Statistics New Zealand’s quarterly Household Labour Force Survey since June 2016 shed some light on the degree of insecure work, though it still leaves many questions. In June 2017, out of the 2.067 million employees in New Zealand, 91 per cent were permanent employees, 5 per cent casual, 3 per cent fixed term, and 0.4 per cent employed through a labour hire agency. One per cent were in seasonal work not otherwise categorised. Just over one in five (21 per cent) of employees and self-employed were part-time, though this does not necessarily imply insecurity.
There were 463,000 people whose main income came from self-employment. Among them are ‘dependent contractors’ who are dependent on one business for most or all of their work but lacking the benefits and protections of an employee. Their condition is described in more detail below. Of the 293,000 self-employed people without employees, 5.5 per cent would prefer not to be self-employed. Few young people aged 15-24 were self-employed (without employees) but a quarter of the young self-employed would prefer not to be.
As will be seen below, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ranks New Zealand as having the lowest overall level of protection of permanent workers against dismissal among all its member countries. New Zealand has a very high turnover of employment expressed in terms of job tenure: in the year to June 2017, 23 per cent of workers had been in their job for less than a year, the third highest proportion in the OECD (2015 OECD data), which averaged 15 per cent. Only 26 per cent had been in their job for over 10 years compared to an average of 34 per cent in the OECD as a whole and 43 per cent in a group of 16 European Union members. While Denmark and Sweden have similar high turnover, they respond with much stronger support
for workers who lose their jobs than New Zealand’s very weak system provides, as will be seen below. The OECD also reports that New Zealand has high flows in and out of unemployment.4
Degree of employee control
Low employee control can be seen in employees’ lack of control or bargaining power over their employment and working arrangements; hours of work that are uncertain or can be changed at will by the employer; or the job is dangerous or unhealthy because of the tasks performed or poor health and safety practices. Among employees, only 18 per cent were protected by a collective employment agreement in June 2017, one of the lowest proportions in the OECD. Further, 7.6 per cent had no written employment agreement at all. This is significantly adds to their vulnerability and is against the law. As will be seen below, in some industries forms of ‘dependent contracting’ dominate. These workers are formally self-employed but may be little different to employees other than having none of the bargaining rights and legal minimum conditions.
Under Pressure reported that at the end of 2012 there were 94,700 workers (66,400 of them permanent) who had “no usual working time” and 118,400 (permanent and temporary) who had less than two weeks notice of their work schedule. The use of ‘availability provisions’ which requires employees to be on call without pay and no guarantee of employment is common in the fast food, hotel, retail and security industries. While many may appear to be permanent or fixed term employees, their reality is that their income and hours worked in a week are unpredictable and variable. In 2016, law changes regulated the use of such practices (including the banning of agreements with a requirement to work but no fixed hours—so-called zero hours contracts).
In 2009 employers were given the ability to introduce ‘fire at will’ conditions for new employees, putting them on a 90 day trial when they can be dismissed at short notice with no good reason and lose personal grievance rights. The use of fire at will provisions were initially restricted to employers with fewer than 20 employees but were later extended to all employers. The National Survey of
Employers for 2014/15 (commissioned by the Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, MBIE) found that two-thirds of surveyed employers has used this at least once in the last twelve months, meaning a minimum of 57,500 employees (probably many more) had been subject to this insecurity and breach of natural justice.5 Almost a quarter of the employers had dismissed employees during the trial over the previous year—at least 13,500 people (again, probably many more). The stated objective was to encourage employers to take on more employees, particularly those from disadvantaged groups. However, a 2016 study found there was no such employment effect; this is consistent with international evidence.6 Despite this failure of the policy to reach its stated aims, the Government has refused to repeal the fire at will provisions.
New Zealand’s appalling health and safety record led to the Government setting up the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety in 2012.7 This followed the Pike River coal mine disaster which cost 29 lives and exposed years of deliberate deregulation and feeble enforcement. The government agency set up as a result of the Taskforce’s report, WorkSafe, estimates that the rate of workplace fatalities in New Zealand is 75 per cent higher than the UK, after adjusting for the different industrial structures in the two countries (2.8 fatalities per 100,000 workers compared to 1.6 in the UK in 2014).8 A report commissioned by the Taskforce showed New Zealand’s fatality rate among nine OECD countries was worst in five of 13 industries compared. These were solely the deaths by injury: in addition, MBIE estimates that there were 600–900 deaths due to workrelated disease during 2010.10 New legislation passed in 2015 will hopefully improve the situation, but it is known that people in precarious work are also likely to have greater health and safety risks. For example, the Taskforce’s report stated: “employees new to positions or engaged in temporary, casual or seasonal work may be particularly at risk” and “there is a lethal nexus between high-risk population groups and high-risk industries.” It identified poor worker participation, low union density and fear of reprisals among the many factors contributing to the poor record.11
Level of income
At worst, incomes can be at or below the minimum wage. But even above the minimum wage income may be insufficient to maintain the wellbeing of workers and their dependents. There is an interaction between insecurity and income. Low income exacerbates the problems of insecurity because workers are unable to build up reserves to take them through periods of zero or low income, while high income earners (such as self-employed lawyers, accountants or other professionals) can tolerate a much higher level of income variability and periods without paid work.
Research the CTU published recently found 36 per cent of employees earned an hourly rate less than the Living Wage in June 2016, a little under 10 per cent were receiving the minimum wage or less, and there appeared to more workers receiving less than the adult minimum wage than would be expected from legal exemptions.12 While there have been quite rapid rises in the minimum wage since 2000 (in the period studied, from 1998 to 2015, the minimum hourly wage rose as fast as the hourly rate for the top decile of wage and salary incomes: 39 per cent after adjusting for inflation), wages rose at only half the rate for the next 50 per cent of employees above the minimum wage (they rose 18-20 per cent). The income per hour of almost 50 per cent of self-employed was below the Living Wage and 37 per cent received less than the minimum wage (though there are ways many self-employed can disguise their income, such as through capital gains).
There is a significant wage penalty for most types of temporary work, so workers suffer from both insecurity and lower wages. Gail Pacheco and Bill Cochrane found a penalty of between 13 per cent and 17 per cent for temporary work but the penalty ranged between zero for fixed term employment and 20 to 24 per cent for casual workers.13
Lack of access to standard non-wage benefits
Lack of access to benefits includes standard non-wage entitlements such as sick leave, annual leave and parental leave, but also covers lack of opportunity to develop and retain skills through opportunities to employer-provided or assisted education and training.
Casual workers frequently miss out on standard non-wage benefits, particularly those requiring a qualifying period of service such as sick leave, bereavement leave, parental leave, and training. They may receive an additional percentage on their pay (eight per cent for casual employees) in place of annual holidays but often are unable to actually take annual leave and miss out on paid public holidays. Other entitlements such as parental leave and sick leave may be available to casual workers who work sufficiently regularly but in practice are rarely claimed. Labour hire, fixed term and seasonal workers may also miss out.
This provides a significant incentive for employers to employ people on such arrangements. In Australia there is a casual loading of up to 25 per cent to recognise this deficit in minimum standards.14 The CTU has estimated that a casual loading in New Zealand should be at least 21 per cent to recognise 20 missed annual holidays (currently recognised by the 8 per cent loading), 11
missed public holidays, five days sick and bereavement leave, and lost benefits such as health and safety representative training leave, employment relations leave, jury duty, notice periods or payment in lieu of notice. The CTU noted that even then there would be “no loading applied, for example, to recognise the negative social costs of casual work nor possible additional or proportionately higher costs such as travel for only a few hours work or the need to find child care at short notice.”15
Even with a loading the worker would still miss out on these benefits and others such as training opportunities. Stephen Blumenfeld found for example that “[e]mployees who are least likely to receive employer–funded education and training include those on 90-day trial periods, temporary, or seasonal employees, fixedterm, casual and temporary agency employees, non-union, or over 55 years of age.” He concluded that “to the extent to which vulnerable segments of society find themselves disproportionately among those in precarious and insecure employment, the trend towards less employer-sponsored education and training likely exacerbates longstanding inequalities in the labour market.”16
Businesses in many industries, including telecommunications, film, courier and road freight, make use of contractors in place of employees in a ‘dependent contractor’ relationship. The contractor is dependent on one business for work but has none of the statutory protections or minimum entitlements of employees such as minimum wages, leave entitlements, personal grievance rights, or the right to collective bargaining. The ‘Hobbit amendment’ to the Employment Relations Act allowed employers in film production to refuse employee status to all workers, forcing them to be contractors, and in many cases dependent contractors. The amendment was passed under urgency in October 2010 with no public consultation as part of the deal the Government did for Warner Brothers in response to their threat to take the production of The Hobbit film series out of New Zealand. In addition many miss out on entitlements because employers flout the law.
Degree of regulatory and union protection
The degree of regulatory and union protection can be present in a number of ways. In practice there may be no protection against unjustifiable dismissal, discrimination, sexual harassment, or unacceptable working practices. Union representation may be low, non-existent or discouraged by the employer. Among employees, only 19 per cent were members of unions in September
2016, and union membership was much lower among temporary workers. Among permanent employees, 19 per cent were union members, but among casual workers, only 8 per cent were in unions, as were 15 per cent of fixed term workers, and 25 per cent of seasonal full time workers. In the private sector, fewer than 10 per cent of employees are members.
Regulatory protection, which might be expected to mitigate lack of union membership, is weak. The OECD ranks New Zealand as having the lowest overall level of protection of permanent workers against dismissal among all its member countries. It ranks individual protection at third lowest and protection against collective dismissals as equal lowest with Chile (both at zero protection).17
Enforcement of labour laws is also weak. There are only 58 labour inspectors in a labour force of 2.5 million—a ratio of 1 for every 43,700 workers, compared to 1 to 19,000 in Australia. They focus only on breaches of minimum employment standards. Other breaches of the law go unenforced, such as employers sacking or otherwise disadvantaging workers who wish to join a union, unless workers can get the help of a union (possibly risking their job in doing so), or are willing to pay for a lawyer. Breaches even of minimum employment standards are common as will be seen in the discussion of migrant worker exploitation.
In a recent study of New Zealand’s support for people who lose their jobs, the OECD commented that “[t]he downside of flexible labour market regulations is that the costs of economic restructuring largely fall onto individual workers.” It quantified these losses: “…wage losses for re-employed displaced workers reach 12 per cent in the first year after displacement, compared with negligible wage effects in Germany and the United Kingdom and a loss of 6 per cent in the United States and Portugal.”18 New Zealand researchers Dean Hyslop and Wilbur Townsend find even greater losses: “Compared to workers who did not lose their jobs, we estimate their employment rate was 20-25% lower in the year following displacement and, although their employment gradually improved, was still 8-12% lower five years later. Similarly, we estimate displaced workers’ conditional earnings and total income were 25-30% lower in the first year and 13-22% lower
five years after being displaced.”19
This is largely because support for displaced workers through the Ministry of Social Development is very weak. As the OECD report described it, “social assistance and public employment support are reduced to a minimum and act very much as systems of last resort for displaced workers who end up in the welfare system.” It reported that “[d]isplaced workers who do not contact Work and Income are very much left on their own to search for a new job or decide about a career change if they want or need it.” It found there is “a high risk of poverty among displaced workers.” We also have some of the lowest levels of income support in the OECD, expressed as a ‘replacement rate’ of the workers’ income before job loss. For example OECD statistics show the income replacement rate is the lowest in the OECD for a low income two-earner couple with two children.20 As a proportion of GDP, New Zealand’s spending on support of all kinds for people who lose their jobs (‘active labour market policies’) is in the bottom third of the OECD according to the above OECD report.21
Migrant workers can be particularly subject to insecurity, exacerbated by precarious rights if they are dependent on a single employer for their work visa, as is often the case. An internal report compiled by CTU policy analyst Nick Henry on migration trends summarises the situation:
Exploitation of migrant workers is widespread in New Zealand.22 ….Research published by MBIE in 2015 found widespread exploitation of migrant workers in the hospitality industry across New Zealand 23 and in the construction industry in Canterbury.24 The results of enforcement activity by the Labour Inspectorate compiled by MacLennan 25 shows significant non-compliance with employment law among New Zealand, including in industries that employ migrant workers.
The most precarious conditions tend to be faced by migrant workers with temporary immigration or work status that makes them dependant on employers to endorse a continuation of their visa, or not to report a violation of conditions.26 Evidence from Australia has shown that the categories of workers most vulnerable to exploitation, and facing the greatest barriers to making complaints, are those on temporary working holiday visas, international students, and those with irregular migration status.27
A survey of the employment experiences of migrant students in New Zealand28 found that 38% were paid less than the minimum wage, 38% were working more than the 20 hours per week allowed by their visa, and 31% reported unsafe conditions of work.
Additional factors can make migrant workers more vulnerable to exploitation, especially in the immediate period after arrival, including lack of familiarity with language and labour rights.29 A survey by Caritas30 found that the first year after migration to New Zealand was a period of heightened vulnerability for migrants, often due to a lack of confidence and social isolation, which tended to improve over time. This means that a high turnover of temporary migrants will tend to contribute to greater vulnerability to exploitation.31
New forms of migrant worker exploitation are looming. Temporary ‘posting’ is where an overseas-based employer brings employees into New Zealand, to carry out a building contract or to maintain equipment it has sold into New Zealand. Posting raises the question as to which country’s employment law applies. It is deemed different from immigration on the grounds that the posted employees have not entered the local ‘labour market’. This can be a legal fiction in that their employment is likely to at least indirectly impact on the conditions of others employed in New Zealand. Posted workers may well find themselves in a vulnerable position if they have employment-related problems while in New Zealand. This was the subject of a recent Employment Relations Authority determination (Rail and Maritime Transport Union v KiwiRail Ltd , NZERA Wellington 5560304). The union unsuccessfully challenged, among other matters, the pay and conditions under which Chinese workers worked in New Zealand when removing asbestos from locomotives their (Chinese) employer had supplied. The RMTU asserted unsuccessfully that KiwiRail had breached their collective agreement, the Minimum Wage Act 1983 and the Holidays Act 2003. However a more recent decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v New Zealand
Basing Ltd  NZSC 139 held that New Zealand discrimination law applied to Cathay Airways pilots with a New Zealand home base. The Supreme Court’s analysis may yet extend to situations similar those of the Chinese locomotive workers.
The employment conditions of posted workers are a major issue in Europe and may grow here with proposals by overseas-based construction companies to bring in their own workforces and operate under their own laws.
This article has focussed on insecurity among people in paid work. However as the authors of the book Precarity: uncertain, insecure and unequal lives in Aotearoa New Zealand point out, a precarious existence is not solely or even mainly limited to the workforce.32 They look at the lives of beneficiaries, people with disabilities, women subject to domestic violence, migrants and refugees, the problems of food insecurity, youth hardship, homelessness, gender and racial discrimination, and many other examples. They estimate that under this definition there are
approximately 600,000 New Zealanders in a precarious situation, among whom females, younger people, those with no or low qualifications, and those with low incomes are overrepresented. The people and the problems they face have many commonalities with insecurity among people in paid work.
As the book points out, the problems of insecurity and precarity descend directly from the often disastrous impacts of neoliberalism and a form of international economic integration (‘globalisation’) constructed on the neoliberal model. This gives priority to ‘the market’ on the assumption that with minimal government intervention it can be optimised to maximise societal and environmental welfare. It considers government action beyond this as a ‘distortion’ and so to be discouraged or even made unlawful. While this belief system is now increasingly widely rejected, particularly following the Global Financial Crisis, it has thrived because it has been a convenient ideological rationalisation for the increasing dominance of large corporate interests over most aspects of our lives. The increased insecurity and more frequent desperation of working people provides increased profits, power and control to employers. It is reinforced by the threat
or reality of contracting out or offshoring of their work and justified as being essential for ‘flexibility’ required by the international economy.
Like all great deceptions, the demand for ‘flexibility’ has a grain of truth. Change is indeed occurring more quickly than in decades gone by, and that requires adaptability. The socially responsible response would be to strengthen systems that support people through those changes as many northern European countries such as Sweden and Denmark did in the early 1990s (now, alas, partly reversing them under conservative governments—but their systems are still far more supportive than New Zealand’s regime). Instead in New Zealand, the supports in our social welfare system, our unions, and government capacity to ensure dying industries were replaced with better ones, were simultaneously throttled. The outcome in human tragedy was entirely foreseeable.
Many of the ‘flexible’ employment practices which produce insecurity, poor working conditions and inadequate incomes for working people have something else in common: employers with lazy business practices or a determination to avoid their responsibilities as an employer. They shift their costs onto their employees or society. The practices frequently leave employees isolated and
unable to take advantage of collective bargaining and union representation. This is rolling back the 20th century’s social and economic advances to a system of employment and social relationships that more resemble those in the nineteenth century than a 21st century in which those advances have been further progressed.
Bill Rosenberg is the Economist and Policy Director at the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions.
1. There are many such sites: for example https://www.quora.com/Are-there-any-similar-services-to-Mechanical-Turk.
2. New Zealand Council of Trade Unions Te Kauae Kaimahi, Under Pressure: A Detailed Report into Insecure Work in New Zealand (Wellington: New Zealand Council of Trade Unions Te Kauae Kaimahi, 2013), accessed 16 October 2017, http://www.union.org.nz/ctu-under-pressure-detailed-report-2/
3. D. Tucker, ‘Precarious’ Non-Standard Employment – A Review of the Literature (Wellington: Department of Labour, 2002); Guy Standing, The Precariat: the New Dangerous Class (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2011).
4. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Back to work, New Zealand: improving the reemployment prospects of displaced workers (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017), accessed 16 October 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264264434-en, 57.
5. Accessed 16 October 2017, http://www.mbie.govt.nz/info-services/employment-skills/labour-marketreports/ national-survey-of-employers/nse-2014-15, appendix.
6. Nathan Chappell and Isabelle Sin, The Effect of Trial Periods in Employment on Firm Hiring Behaviour, Working Paper No. 16/03, (Wellington: Treasury, 2016), accessed 16 October 2017, http://purl.oclc.org/ nzt/p-1834
7. Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, The report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety: he korowai whakaruruhau (Wellington: New Zealand Government, 2013), accessed 16 October 2017, http://www.hstaskforce.govt.nz/
8. WorkSafe New Zealand, Towards 2020: Progress towards the Government’s Working Safer fatality and serious injury reduction target (Wellington: WorkSafe New Zealand, 2017), accessed 16 October 2017, http://www.worksafe.govt.nz/worksafe/research/health-and-safety-data/towards-2020/towards-2020-may-2017.pdf, 21.
9. R. Lilley, A. Samaranayaka, and H. Weiss, International comparison of International Labour Organisation published occupational fatal injury rates: How does New Zealand compare internationally? (Wellington: Injury Prevention Research Unit, Department of Preventive and Social Medicine, Dunedin School of Medicine, University of Otago, 2013), accessed 16 October 2017, http://hstaskforce.govt.nz/documents/comparison-ofilo-published-occupational-fatal-injury-rates.pdf, 25.
10. Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE), Work-related disease in New Zealand: the state of play in 2010 (Wellington: Labour and Commercial Environment, MBIE, 2013), accessed 16 October 2017, http://thehub.superu.govt.nz/project/work-related-disease-new-zealand
11. Ibid, 13, 24.
12. B. Rosenberg, Shrinking portions to low and middle-income earners: Inequality in Wages & Self-Employment 1998-2015 (Wellington: New Zealand Council of Trade Unions Te Kauae Kaimahi, 2017), accessed 16 October 2017, http://www.union.org.nz/wage-and-salary-earners-below-the-average-wage-lost-out-onincome-growth/inequality-wages-self-employment-1998-2015/
13. G. Pacheco and B. Cochrane, Decomposing the temporary-permanent wage gap in New Zealand, Working Paper No. 2015/07, (Auckland: AUT University, 2015), accessed 16 October 2017, http://www.aut.ac.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/581824/Economics-WP-2015-07.pdf
14. For example the Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010, the Food, Beverage and Tobacco Manufacturing Award 2010 and the Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010 – see: https://www.fairwork.gov.au/awards-and-agreements/awards/list-of-awards.
15. New Zealand Council of Trade Unions ‘Submission of the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions Te Kauae Kaimahi on the Employment Standards Legislation Bill’, October 2015, accessed 16 October 2017, http://www.union.org.nz/employment-standards-legislation-bill/, 23ff.
16. S. Blumenfeld, Precarious and Insecure Employment and Employer-supported Training in New Zealand (Wellington: Centre for Labour, Employment and Work, Victoria University of Wellington, 2016), accessed 16 October 2017, http://clew.cmail2.com/t/d-l-iytyhhl-kdgtdkhk-h/
17. OECD, Back to work, New Zealand: improving the re-employment prospects of displaced workers (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2017), accessed 16 October 2017, http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264264434-en, 53.
19. D. Hyslop and W. Townsend, The Longer Term Impacts of Job Displacement on Labour Market Outcomes, Working Paper No. 17–12, (Wellington: Motu Economic and Public Policy Research, 2017), http://motu.nz/our-work/population-and-labour/individual-and-group-outcomes/the-longer-term-impacts-of-jobdisplacement-on-labour-market-outcomes/
20. Net replacement rates during the initial phase of unemployment, 2001-2015, available at http://www.oecd.org/els/benefits-and-wages-statistics.htm.
21. OECD, Back to work, 87.
22. C. Stringer, Worker Exploitation in New Zealand: A Troubling Landscape (Auckland: The Human Trafficking Research Coalition, 2016), Retrieved from https://www.workerexploitation.com/report.
23. W. Searle, K. McLeod, and C. Stichbury, Vulnerable Temporary Migrant Workers: Hospitality Industry (Wellington: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2015) Retrieved from http://www.mbie.govt.nz/publications-research/research/migrants—settlement/vulnerable-temporary-migrant-workers-hospitalityindustry-2015.pdf.
24. W. Searle, K. McLeod, and N. Ellen-Eliza, Vulnerable Temporary Migrant Workers: Canterbury Construction Industry (Wellington: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2015), Retrieved from http://www.mbie.govt.nz/publications-research/research/migrants—settlement/vulnerable-temporary-migrant-workerscanterbury-construction.pdf.
25. C. MacLennan, ‘Wage Theft in Aotearoa/New Zealand: How employers are stealing millions of dollars from workers and how to fix it’, April 2017, Retrieved from http://www.standagainstslavery.com/wage-theftin-aotearoa-new-zealand/.
26. S. Yuan, T. Cain and P. Spoonley, Temporary Migrants as Vulnerable Workers: A literature review (Wellington: Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment, 2014), Retrieved from http://www.massey.ac.nz/massey/fms/Research/ntom/Yuan%20Cain%20and%20Spoonley%202014pdf?23A2F083283EE192CA49A530EA4B72F8, 47.
27. UNSW Human Rights Clinic, Temporary Migrant Workers in Australia (Issues Paper 2014) Retrieved from http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/sites/law.unsw.edu.au/files/file_attach/migrant_workers_paper_final_artwork_16_oct.pdf.
28. D. Anderson, R. Lamare and Z. Hannif, ‘The Working Experiences of Student Migrants in Australia and New Zealand’, in Young People at Work, ed. Robin Price, Paula McDonald, Janis Bailey, and Barbara Pini (New York: Routledge, 2011).
29. Yuan et al.
30. Caritas Aotearoa New Zealand, Stand up for what’s right: Supporting migrant workers, 2016, retrieved from http://www.caritas.org.nz/system/files/SJW%20research%20paper_web.pdf
31. N. Henry, ‘New Zealand Migration Trends and Impact on Employment’, Wellington: New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, 2017
32. S. Groot, C. Van Ommen, B. Masters-Awatere and N. Tassell-Matamua, Precarity: uncertain, insecure and unequal lives in Aotearoa New Zealand (Auckland: Massey University Press, 2017). See the Reviews section of this issue for more on the book.